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There has been longstanding interest from both experimental psychologists and
cognitive neuroscientists in the potential modulatory role of various top–down factors
on multisensory integration/perception in humans. One such top–down influence,
often referred to in the literature as the ‘unity assumption,’ is thought to occur in
those situations in which an observer considers that various of the unisensory stimuli
that they have been presented with belong to one and the same object or event
(Welch and Warren, 1980). Here, we review the possible factors that may lead to the
emergence of the unity assumption. We then critically evaluate the evidence concerning
the consequences of the unity assumption from studies of the spatial and temporal
ventriloquism effects, from the McGurk effect, and from the Colavita visual dominance
paradigm. The research that has been published to date using these tasks provides
support for the claim that the unity assumption influences multisensory perception
under at least a subset of experimental conditions. We then consider whether the
notion has been superseded in recent years by the introduction of priors in Bayesian
causal inference models of human multisensory perception. We suggest that the prior
of common cause (that is, the prior concerning whether multisensory signals originate
from the same source or not) offers the most useful way to quantify the unity assumption
as a continuous cognitive variable.
Keywords: the unity effect, the unity assumption, coupling priors, crossmodal correspondences, semantic
congruency
INTRODUCTION
The ‘unity assumption’ is an observer’s assumption, or belief, that two or more unisensory cues
belong together (i.e., that they come from the same object or event1, Welch and Warren, 1980,
1986; Spence, 2007; Chen and Vroomen, 2013). Such an assumption, or belief2, on the part of
the observer serves as a cognitive modulator of multisensory integration, leading to the empirical
observations described as the ‘unity effect’. The unity assumption certainly serves as one of the key
1Instead of simply using the term “object,” which may implicitly refer to a concrete material thing (see Kubovy and van
Valkenburg, 2001), the term “event” is used here in order to emphasize the temporal property that is typically associated with
multisensory stimulation and which can be defined by the onset and offset of a stimulus giving rise to a dynamic change, such
as someone opening his/her mouth to produce a word.
2The use of the term ‘assumption’ or ‘belief ’ might lead one to suggest that this modulatory factor relies on the observer being
consciously aware of the connection, or relation, between the component unisensory signals. Such a view is encouraged by
the fact that many of the examples cited by Welch and Warren (1980) in their early review involved those situations in which
the participants were explicitly provided with the unity assumption by the experimenter. However, at the outset it would seem
more parsimonious to remain agnostic on this issue (see Deroy, 2013). That is, to assume that the unity assumption need not
be represented consciously, although, of course, sometimes it might be (e.g., Klapetek et al., 2012; Faivre et al., 2014).
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mechanisms by which the human brain solves the crossmodal
binding problem; that is, how signals from the different
senses are encoded into a unified object/event representation
(Senkowski et al., 2008; Spence, 2011). Furthermore, the unity
assumption provides a good example pertinent to the long-
standing debate concerning the role of cognitive penetration
on human perception. To date, though, visual rather than
multisensory cases have constituted the primary focus in previous
reviews (e.g., Bruner, 1957; Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1999; Vetter
and Newen, 2014; Firestone and Scholl, 2016).
More generally, the unity assumption can be thought of as one
of a number of factors that influence the binding of multisensory
cues (see Figure 1; see also Spence, 2007, for a review). Over the
last 30 years or so, researchers have generally tended to focus
their attention on the role of spatiotemporal coincidence on
multisensory integration (see Stein and Meredith, 1993; Calvert
et al., 2004; Bremner et al., 2012; Stein, 2012, for reviews).
Nevertheless, the last 10 years has seen a rapid growth of interest
in the role of various higher-level factors, such as semantic
congruency (e.g., a dog and a barking sound, Doehrmann and
Naumer, 2008; Chen and Spence, 2010, Chen and Spence,
2011b; Naumer and Kaiser, 2010), crossmodal correspondences
(e.g., based on the internalization of the statistical regularity
between pitch and size, Spence, 2011; Parise and Spence, 2013),
and the ‘unity assumption’ (e.g., Vatakis and Spence, 2007)
in multisensory integration. Admittedly, it can sometimes be
difficult to clearly distinguish between the latter factors3. Here,
we will critically assess whether research on the topics of
crossmodal correspondences and semantic congruency should
also be considered as relevant to the debate concerning the role
of the unity assumption in multisensory integration.
A growing body of empirical research, utilizing a wide range
of different experimental paradigms, demonstrates that the unity
assumption modulates multisensory integration under at least a
subset of experimental conditions. In this review, we critically
evaluate the sometimes conflicting evidence from studies of the
ventriloquism effect (both spatial and temporal; Jackson, 1953;
Morein-Zamir et al., 2003), the McGurk effect (McGurk and
3Using human speech stimuli and naturalistic events like balls bouncing off a
surface, Vatakis and Spence (2007, 2008) framed their results in terms of ‘the
unity effect.’ One could, though, perhaps also describe their study in terms of
semantic congruency effects. The distinction (or perhaps, better said, convention)
here is that when the same object or environmental event is involved then the
unity effect is evoked, whereas when the same category but not necessarily the
specific exemplar object or event is presented, then semantic congruency is more
commonly used.
FIGURE 1 | Welch and Warren’s (1980) early model of multisensory interactions concerning those situations in which “intersensory bias would
occur.” The first stage which pertains to stimulus situation includes the descriptive characteristics of the signals that will be received by multiple sensory systems
(i.e., these are so-called ‘amodal’ features), and the observer’s current goal. Notice here that spatial and temporal coincidences were listed at this first stage. This
constrains what goes on at later stages of information processing. The second stage, modality characteristics, determines how the sensory signals are received and
represented, such as that the shape of a 3-D object is perceived as a 2-D visual array initially by the visual system, but its surface and edge are perceived by the
cutaneous and proprioceptive systems. The third stage, observer processes, concerns how human brains process/integrate the information from different modalities
in order to fit the task goal. The general historical factors refer to the long-term likelihood that the information from different sensory modalities should go together; by
contrast, the specific historical factors refer to the observer’s past experience regarding a particular stimulus pair, such as one’s pet dog and its unique barks, should
undoubtedly go together. The model also suggests that the observer’s attention is primarily allocated to the modality that is typically most appropriate to the current
task, such as vision in spatial tasks and audition in temporal tasks. Nevertheless, experimenter’s instruction or task demands may leads to the shift of attention to
another sensory modality (i.e., secondary attention). The unity assumption factor listed at this stage is the main interest of the current review paper. These serial
processes lead to a perceptual outcome that either the discrepant information from different sensory modalities is integrated, so intersensory bias would be
observed, or, instead, the discrepant information is represented separately, so the discrepancy between the two sensory stimuli would be detected. Back in the
1980s, feed-forward models were the predominant view given the popular and rapidly developing approach of computational neural models. Nowadays, of course,
we realize that feedback may be just as, if not even more, important (e.g., Talsma et al., 2010). This figure is reproduced from Figure 1 in Welch and Warren (1980).
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MacDonald, 1976), and the Colavita visual dominance effect (e.g.,
Colavita, 1974; Spence et al., 2011). These empirical results help
answer the question of the conditions under which the unity
assumption is formed and modulates multisensory integration in
humans.
In recent years, researchers have suggested that assumptions
concerning the multisensory inputs that likely belong together
could be represented as ‘coupling priors’ or ‘prior of common
cause’ according to Bayesian models (e.g., Ernst, 2007; Sato
et al., 2007; Shams and Beierholm, 2010). The Bayesian approach
certainly provides one means of formalizing different degrees of
certainty regarding the unity of two or more unisensory inputs as
a continuous (rather than as a discrete) variable (e.g., Körding
et al., 2007). It should, however, be noted that the Bayesian
approach is not without its critics. Some, for instance, have
argued that Bayesian models simply re-express the cognitive
model in mathematical language (see Murphy, 1993; Jones and
Love, 2011; Bowers and Davis, 2012).
Taken together, there is, then, currently good evidence
to support the view that the unity assumption influences
multisensory integration under at least a subset of experimental
conditions. Here, we address the question of why null results
have sometimes been reported in previous studies. We also raise
the question of whether the notion of the ‘unity assumption’
still has value in the era of ‘priors’ in Bayesian models. We
question whether these terms are, in fact, co-terminous. We
also evaluate the evidence concerning how rapidly the unity
effect can be demonstrated when formerly unrelated pairs of
sensory stimuli are experienced together (that is, when they
are presented together). Finally, we highlight some of the key
questions awaiting future research in this area.
FACTORS LEADING TO THE UNITY
ASSUMPTION
It has long been argued that whenever two or more sensory inputs
are considered as in some sense ‘going together,’ observers will
be more likely to treat them as referring to a single multisensory
object or event, as compared to the condition where such
an assumption is lacking (e.g., Thomas, 1941; Jackson, 1953;
Welch and Warren, 1980, for early examples). Consequently, an
observer will be more likely to infer that the sensory inputs have a
common spatiotemporal origin as well. Hence, they will be more
likely to bind the inputs into a single multisensory object/event
representation (see Bedford, 2001).
The situation at the cinema, where we hear the voices
as coming from the lips of the actors that we see talking
on the screen (rather than from the loudspeakers situated
elsewhere in the auditorium, known as the spatial ventriloquism
effect), provides an illustrative everyday example here. Many
commentators have taken this common experience as evidence of
the unity effect in action. They often point to the apparent visual
capture of auditory localization that is commonly experienced
in such situations. However, it is worth noting that this may
be more of an unconsidered assumption than an empirically
demonstrated phenomenon. Indeed, back in the psychophysics
laboratory, one tends to see partial capture, with the sound being
moved just a few degrees toward the perceived location of the
simultaneously presented visual stimulus (e.g., see Jackson, 1953;
Bertelson and Aschersleben, 1998; Alais and Burr, 2004). Some
studies have also reported that the visual stimulus is mislocated
slightly toward the auditory stimulus as well (e.g., Bertelson and
Radeau, 1981).
In early studies, the unity effect was mainly demonstrated
by experimenters who would provide their participants with
explicit instructions that the sensory inputs from different
modalities either came from the same or from different sources
(see Welch and Warren, 1980, for an early review). Such
experimenter-induced beliefs were, for example, reported to
affect the amount of adaptation that was seen following exposure
to both audiovisual (Radeau and Bertelson, 1974) and visual-
proprioceptive conflict (Welch, 1972). On the other hand, the
unity effect can also be induced implicitly by stimuli with
highly congruent properties, such as their redundancy in terms
of temporal synchrony, and the observer’s prior experiences
(either long-term knowledge-based or short-term contextual-
based).
In the knowledge-based cases, for example, crossmodal
correspondences and semantic congruency are two of the
factors that plausibly give rise to different levels of congruency
concerning the crossmodal sensory inputs. Such a unity
assumption induced by the properties of the stimuli was also
proposed in Welch and Warren’s seminal review paper, where
the researchers talked of the “compellingness of the stimulus
situation.” They went on to suggest that “a highly compelling
situation is one in which the assumption of unity is strong” (Welch
and Warren, 1980, p. 649; see also Warren et al., 1981). As in
the above example, the video and audio presented in a cinema
constitutes a highly compelling situation, since there seems no
better assumption regarding the source of the voice other than
that it came from the actor’s lips. Unfortunately, though, Welch
and Warren provided no independent means of characterizing
the compellingness of a particular pairing of unisensory stimuli,
thus meaning that the term is pretty much useless (or, rather,
unconstrained), practically speaking.
Experimenter Instructions
Welch and Warren (1980) reviewed those early studies in which
the participant’s belief regarding the common or separate sources
of the multisensory inputs was manipulated explicitly, and
different perceptual outcomes were demonstrated. For example,
Miller (1972) had the participants in his study see and feel
different shapes. When the participants were instructed that
“they would be seeing and feeling identical halves of the same
object” (p. 121), their performance on the shape matching task
demonstrated visual dominance (e.g., Rock and Victor, 1964).
However, when the participants were instructed ambiguously
“to look at ‘something’ and feel ‘something’ and then to match
‘the object”’ (p. 122), they were able to accurately report on the
shape that they were feeling (i.e., with no bias by the visual
information). Note that the use of instructions in order to try
and encourage participants to integrate multisensory information
is still sometimes used, as in those studies that have wanted to
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test optimal statistical integration based on Bayesian models (e.g.,
Alais and Burr, 2004, to ask their participants to “think the display
as a ball thudding onto the screen,” p. 260).
Miller’s (1972) results provide a powerful demonstration
of the modulatory role of the experimenter’s instructions
on multisensory integration. However, in Warren et al.’s
(1981) study, the instructions provided by the experimenter
were shown to modulate the spatial ventriloquism effect
only in certain conditions when multisensory speech stimuli
were used. Specifically, they demonstrated a larger spatial
bias of auditory localization by vision when the participants
were instructed that the stimuli came from the same event
rather than separate events (see the section “The Spatial
Ventriloquism Effect”). Nevertheless, the instructions given
by the experimenter modulated spatial ventriloquism only
when the video of a speaker’s face and voice were presented
synchronously rather than asynchronously, and only when
the speaker’s face was presented rather than when it was
replaced by a piece of tape. In summary, instructions
concerning whether multisensory signals belong to the same
object/event or not constitute an explicit and exceedingly
simple means by which to demonstrate the unity effect.
Importantly, however, it may not be sufficient (e.g., Warren et al.,
1981).
Redundant Information
Inputs from different sensory modalities sometimes provide
information about the same attribute or feature, thus potentially
giving rise to informational redundancy. Crossmodal
redundancy occurs primarily in those domains that some
researchers like to call amodal, such as space and time, as well
as stimulus intensity, size, and shape (see Walker-Andrews,
1994; Spence, 2011). Spatial and temporal coincidence, for
example, are two well-recognized factors that can enhance
multisensory integration (see Stein and Meredith, 1993; Spence,
2007, for reviews; though see also Spence, 2013). In the model
proposed by Welch and Warren (1980, see Figure 1), spatial
and temporal coincidence are listed under those factors that
belong to the stimulus situation. Specifically, multisensory
stimuli that are presented close in time or space may have been
encoded and/or integrated during the feed-forward processing
(i.e., in a bottom–up fashion, see Stein and Meredith, 1993;
Noesselt et al., 2010; van Atteveldt et al., 2014). Nevertheless,
it is important to note that spatial and temporal coincidence
have also been designated as cognitive factors. For example, in
Warren et al.’s (1981) study, the visual and auditory stimuli were
either presented synchronously or else asynchronously (with a
150 ms delay in one of the signals). The suggestion was that the
former condition would deliver a higher degree of compellingness
(leading to a stronger assumption of unity) than the latter
situation.
More recent studies have provided evidence that the unity
assumption regarding visual and tactile signals is stronger when
the participants view their own hand grasping or exploring an
object. So, for example, Helbig and Ernst (2007) demonstrated
that the unity assumption induced by such means powerfully
modulated visual-tactile integration, irrespective of whether the
perceived location of the visual and tactile object was the
same or different (i.e., mirror reflection could be used to make
the visual object(s) appear at an illusory location). Subsequent
studies demonstrated that the forming of the unity assumption
depends on the participants seeing their own exploratory
hand movements (i.e., the congruent visual and proprioceptive
information) rather than their “knowing” that what is seen and
touched necessarily refer to the same object (cf. Miller, 1972;
Misceo and Taylor, 2011; Misceo et al., 2014). Combined, seeing
and feeling the object via exploratory movement at the same
time appears critical to inducing a unity effect for visuotactile
integration (see Lacey and Sathian, 2014, for a review).
Crossmodal Correspondences
Typically, research on the crossmodal correspondences, the latter
referring to the compatibility between features or polarized
dimensions between crossmodal stimuli (see Spence, 2011, for
a review), has traditionally not been considered within the
literature on the unity effect. However, it is clear that crossmodal
correspondences can be seen as fitting within the broad scope
of the unity assumption. Indeed, a growing body of research
conducted over the last 40 years or so has shown that people
feel that certain sensory-specific attributes (or features) go, or
belong, together, even if they do not necessarily believe that they
ever co-occur within one and the same object (see Figure 2). For
example, even though a higher-pitched tone is likely produced by
a relatively smaller object, the mapping between the dimensions
of size and pitch is relative and context-dependent rather than
absolute (i.e., there is no one-to-one mapping, see Gallace and
Spence, 2006).
Parise and Spence (2009), for example, demonstrated that
people exhibited a significant unity effect attributable to
crossmodal correspondences (see also Parise and Spence, 2008).
In their study, participants made unspeeded temporal order
judgments (TOJs) concerning whether a visual or auditory
stimulus had been presented second4 (see the section “The
Temporal Ventriloquism Effect”). The stimulus onset asynchrony
(SOA) was varied on a trial-by-trial basis using the method
of constant stimuli. The visual and auditory stimuli presented
in each trial were chosen to be either crossmodally congruent
or incongruent; in particular, the visual stimulus consisted of
either a smaller or larger circle, corresponding to higher- or
lower-pitched tones in the auditory modality, respectively (see
Figure 3A). The results demonstrated that participants found it
significantly harder to discriminate the correct temporal order
of the visual and auditory stimuli (i.e., a larger just noticeable
difference (JND) was observed) for those pairs of stimuli that
4Here, it is perhaps worth noting that the TOJ task actively encourages participants
to try and keep the component unisensory stimuli segregated. By contrast, the
simultaneity judgment (SJ) task, wherein participants have to judge whether two
stimuli were presented at the same time or not can be seen as encouraging the
observer to try and bind the stimuli together instead. Hence, any researcher who
demonstrates a unity effect in an SJ task would leave him/herself open to the
criticism that their results reflected nothing more than a response bias (a bias
to assume that the stimuli went together). Here it should be noted that there
is an on-going debate in the literature as to whether performance on these two
tasks gives rise to compatible results (e.g., van Eijk et al., 2008; García-Pérez and
Alcalá-Quintana, 2012; Love et al., 2013).
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FIGURE 2 | A schematic figure using two dimensions to represent the
relationships between the three top–down modulatory factors in
studies of multisensory perception: the unity assumption, crossmodal
correspondences, and semantic congruency. The X-axis highlights the
fact that crossmodal correspondences typically constitute relative, rather than
absolute, mappings between modality-specific dimensions (such as higher
pitch and larger size, see Gallace and Spence, 2006), while semantically
congruent stimuli refer to those features/attributes mapped to a common
object or category. The Y-axis represents the spatiotemporal disparity
between the stimuli. The effects of crossmodal correspondences and
semantic congruency often occur between stimuli in a larger temporal
disparity over hundreds of ms that are represented as two distinct events,
such as the studies demonstrating crossmodal semantic priming (Chen and
Spence, 2011b, 2013). The unity effect attributable to crossmodal
correspondences or semantic congruency has, though, only been observed
when the stimuli were presented in a range within 100 ms (Vatakis and
Spence, 2007; Parise and Spence, 2009).
were crossmodally congruent than for those pairs that were
incongruent (see Figure 3B). A similar pattern of results was
obtained from the correspondence between rounded visual shape
and auditory low-pitched sine-wave tone, as well as between
spikey visual shapes and auditory high-pitched square-wave tone.
What is more, Parise and Spence (2009) demonstrated that
audiovisual crossmodal correspondences between visual size and
auditory pitch also modulate the spatial aspects of multisensory
integration. That is, crossmodally congruent pairs of visual
and auditory stimuli gave rise to spatial ventriloquism over
a wider range of spatial disparities than incongruent stimulus
pairings. The results of the three experiments reported by
Parise and Spence (2009) are consistent with the view that
more pronounced multisensory integration occurs for congruent
visual and auditory stimuli than for those pairs of stimuli that
happen to be incongruent. Hence, research on the crossmodal
correspondences provides support for the unity assumption (see
also Miller, 1991, for a similar conclusion based on a study of
the redundant target effect). However, here it is worth noting,
in closing, that just because certain crossmodal correspondences
influence multisensory integration, it certainly does not mean
that all correspondences necessarily will (e.g., Stekelenburg and
Keetels, 2015).
Semantic Congruency
A large body of empirical research has demonstrated the
influence on perception in one sensory modality of the
presentation of a semantically congruent stimulus in another
modality (e.g., a dog’s image and a barking sound), as compared
to a semantically incongruent one. To date, the majority of such
studies have focused on the case of audiovisual interactions (see
Doehrmann and Naumer, 2008, for a review). Researchers often
presume that visual and auditory stimuli are integrated when they
are semantically congruent and some form of enhancement in
their participants’ behavioral performance or brain activities will
be observed (Laurienti et al., 2004; Molholm et al., 2004; Taylor
et al., 2006; Hein et al., 2007; Yuval-Greenberg and Deouell, 2007;
Adam and Noppeney, 2010; Chen and Spence, 2010; Werner and
Noppeney, 2010).
Once again, it can be argued that the literature on semantic
congruency effects can be subsumed within broader questions
about the influence of the unity assumption on multisensory
integration. Just as was the case for the literature on crossmodal
correspondences, it is hard to tease apart the exact differences
between those bodies of research. Over the years, however, the
unity effects and semantic congruency effects have tended to be
grouped under rather different research headings.
Here, it is also worth noting that Chen and Spence
(2011b, 2013) did not actually consider the crossmodal
semantic congruency effects they documented as resulting from
multisensory integration. Rather, they suggested that these effects
could simply be explained in terms of the semantic priming of
one object/event by another (see Gordon and Irwin, 1996). Such
an interpretation was supported by the fact that the semantic
congruency effect appeared to be maximal when the auditory
stimulus was presented a few hundreds of ms before the visual
stimulus rather than when the two stimuli were presented at
the same time. In addition, semantic congruency effects can
be explained by memory consolidation whenever the auditory
stimulus is presented some few hundreds of ms after the visual
stimulus (Chen and Spence, 2010).
The majority of studies that have attempted to assess the
impact of semantic congruency on multisensory perception have
actually used stimuli that, while referring to the same basic
category or concept, are not realistic objects or events that we
encounter in daily life; that is, they often lack ecological validity.
In fact, most studies of semantic congruency have presented line
drawings or pictures of objects (the former often taken from
the classic database of Snodgrass and Vanderwart, 1980) together
with a sound that is typically produced by a given object – e.g., the
meowing of a cat to go with the static picture of a cat, or a barking
sound to go with the picture of a dog. Indeed, Edmiston and
Lupyan (2015) have recently demonstrated that people’s matching
performance between a picture and a sound was systematically
improved when the picture resembled the moment when a sound
is producing (e.g., a dog with open mouth5). As such, it can
5In such cases, the associations between visual and auditory signals are twofold: in
addition to the semantic congruency (i.e., the dog image and the barking sound),
there is also a causal relationship (i.e., the dog open its mouth to produce the
barking sound). The pairs of stimuli that are semantically congruent or causally
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FIGURE 3 | Examples of stimuli and the results of Parise and Spence’s (2009) study of the unity effect using in a temporal order judgment (TOJ) task.
(A) The crossmodal correspondences between visual size and auditory pitch. (B) The results demonstrated that it was harder for participants to correctly judge the
presentation order of a visual and auditory stimulus (i.e., the just noticeable difference (JND) was significantly higher) when the stimuli were congruent than
incongruent.
be argued that there would seem to be little likelihood that the
participants in those studies using static line-drawings had any
reason to believe that what they were seeing and hearing actually
referred to the same object or event.
Context
In an early study, Engel and Dougherty (1971) reported that
people’s perception of audiovisual simultaneity is systematically
shifted with the distance of the stimulus location (see also Sugita
and Suzuki, 2003; Alais and Carlile, 2005; though see Arnold
et al., 2005). Later studies demonstrated that, either after passively
adapting to asynchronous audiovisual events (Fujisaki et al.,
2004; Vroomen et al., 2004), or after being trained to discriminate
audiovisual synchrony (vs. asynchrony) with feedback (Powers
et al., 2009), people’s perception of audiovisual simultaneity
would change accordingly (see Vroomen and Keetels, 2010, for
a review). These results suggest that the mechanisms underlying
human multisensory perception are flexible and malleable.
Such flexibility in multisensory perception leads to the
contextual effect that, when encountering the same pairs
of multisensory stimuli, the processing of these stimuli can
be modulated by the context provided by prior perceptual
experience. For example, people were more likely to integrate
the visual and auditory signals after having been presented
with congruent (rather than incongruent) pairs of visual lip
movements and spoken syllables (Nahorna et al., 2012). The
contextual modulation can be very rapid in the case of
audiovisual perception, occurring even on a trial-by-trial basis.
related, nevertheless, may give rise to different perceptual outcomes, especially in
the temporal domain. For example, in a ball bouncing event, human participants
were less sensitive to the temporal asynchrony when the visual collision was
presented before the impact sound, as compared to the reversed condition of the
sound leading the visual collision (e.g., van Eijk et al., 2008; Schutz and Kubovy,
2009; Mitterer and Jesse, 2010).
For example, when the asynchronous visual and auditory stimuli
in a given trial were perceived as having been presented at the
same time, this can bias the perception in the following trial
(van der Burg et al., 2013). Hence, audiovisual perception seems
highly malleable and susceptible to the context induced by prior
experience. Nevertheless, similar results have not been observed
in visuotactile or audiotactile perception yet (van der Burg et al.,
2015).
Interim Summary
In this section, the possible factors inducing the unity assumption
have been reviewed: the unity assumption can either be
provided explicitly, typically by means of instructions from the
experimenter, or may emerge implicitly based on the properties of
the stimuli that are presented (including redundant information,
crossmodal correspondences, and semantic congruency).
Researchers plausibly agree that the latter three serve as critical
factors underlying the unity effect. Nevertheless these influences
may (and mostly have) been examined as independent factors
in the empirical literature. This fact, on the other hand, may
also reflect the fact that, even though crossmodal stimuli are
inherently associated when they are redundant, corresponding,
or semantically congruent, they do not necessarily have to be
integrated as a unitary object or event representation and lead to
the unity effect. Finally, prior experience provides a context that
modulates the subsequent multisensory stimuli to be integrated,
or kept separate instead.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE UNITY
EFFECT
Reviewing the literature in this area, it soon becomes apparent
that the unity effect has proved to be one of the most contentious
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issues in multisensory perception research over the last 60 years
or so (e.g., Vroomen, 1999; Welch, 1999; see Welch and Warren,
1980; Vatakis and Spence, 2007; Chen and Vroomen, 2013,
for reviews). Below, we review the evidence of the unity effect
from four paradigms: spatial and temporal ventriloquism, the
McGurk effect, and the Colavita visual dominance effect. These
paradigms are commonly used to evaluate the unity effect because
they are conventionally considered as prototypical examples of
multisensory integration.
The Spatial Ventriloquism Effect
The first empirical evidence relevant to addressing the unity
effect was published by Jackson (1953; see Table 1). He used
spatial ventriloquism whereby judgments of the location from
which a sound had been presented were biased by a spatially
disparate visual stimulus. The unity effect was demonstrated
by the bias in the perceived location of the sound of a steam
whistle resulting from the sight of a steaming kettle being
larger than the bias of a bell sound that was paired with
a spark of light. The latter was an arbitrary combination of
auditory and visual stimuli that should not have led to a strong
assumption of unity. These results have been taken by some
researchers to suggest that any unity assumption that results
from a semantically congruent (as opposed to incongruent)
stimulus pair can indeed facilitate multisensory integration across
a wider range of spatial discrepancies. An alternative possibility
here, though, is that the temporal correlation between the
whistle and kettle signals, given their rich temporal variation,
was presumably higher than the pairing of the bell and the
spark of light. This proposition is supported by recent findings
demonstrating that temporally correlated signals do indeed give
rise to an increase in multisensory binding (e.g., see Parise et al.,
2012, 2013). In summary, the suggestion is that the strength
of the coupling between the visual and auditory stimuli in
terms of their semantic congruency and/or temporal correlation
modulates the unity effect as indexed by the disparity range
over which spatial ventriloquism occurred in Jackson’s (1953)
study.
In contrast to Jackson’s (1953) results, though, other
researchers subsequently failed to demonstrate any unity
effect when using the spatial ventriloquism aftereffect as the
dependent variable. For example, Radeau and Bertelson (1977,
1978) presented their participants with realistic audiovisual
pairings, such as the video of a person’s speaking face
and voice, or the video of the hands of someone playing
the bongos and the associated drumming sounds. For
comparisons, non-realistic pairings consisted of the same
sounds but the visual stimuli were replaced by a light that was
synchronized with the rhythm of the sounds. The influence of
the unity assumption was assessed by measuring the change
in unisensory auditory localization performance following
adaptation to the auditory and visual stimuli that had been
separated by 20◦. Specifically, the spatial representation
of the auditory stimuli should be re-aligned toward the
location of the visual stimulus if they were integrated during
adaptation. Such audiovisual spatial re-alignment would
remain after adaptation, therefore named the ventriloquism
aftereffect.
Radeau and Bertelson’s (1977, 1978) results revealed that
the magnitude of the ventriloquism aftereffect was similar
following adaptation to both realistic and unrealistic stimulus
pairings. These similar aftereffects, though, can perhaps be
attributed either to the particular stimuli that were used or to
the specific experimental paradigm. Note that the visual and
auditory stimuli in both the realistic and unrealistic pairings
were highly correlated in terms of their temporal structure. This
might have been sufficient to lead to multisensory integration
regardless of the realism of the stimuli (e.g., Parise et al., 2012,
TABLE 1 | Summary of the unity effect demonstrated in studies of the spatial ventriloquism effect.
Study Origins of the unity
assumption
Stimuli Experimental paradigm Effect?
Jackson, 1953 Semantic congruency, redundant information
(temporal structure)
Kettle and whistle vs. light and bell Spatial ventriloquism Yes
Warren et al.,
1981
Instruction, redundant information (temporal
synchrony), and semantic congruency
Human face and voice vs. tape mark
and voice (Experiment 1)
Spatial ventriloquism
(Experiment 1)
Yes, but only when the
stimuli were
synchronous and
semantically congruent
Human face/spot and voice/click
(Experiment 4)
Spatial discrimination
(Experiment 4)
Wallace et al.,
2004
Redundant information (spatial and temporal
coincidence)
Light and white noise Spatial ventriloquism Yes
Parise and
Spence, 2009
Crossmodal correspondence (size and pitch) Visual disk and pure tone Spatial discrimination Yes
Kanaya and
Yokosawa, 2011
Semantic congruency Human speech Spatial ventriloquism Yes
Wozny and
Shams, 2011
Context Visual white-noise disk and auditory
white-noise burst
Auditory spatial realignment Yes
Radeau and
Bertelson, 1977
Semantic congruency Human speech or playing bongos (full
video vs. synchronized light)
Spatial ventriloquism aftereffect No
Radeau and
Bertelson, 1978
Semantic congruency, instruction Playing bongos (full video vs.
synchronized light)
Spatial ventriloquism aftereffect No
Colin et al., 2001 Semantic congruency Human speech Spatial ventriloquism No
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2013)6. In addition, in their test session following adaptation,
only the to-be-localized sound, rather than any visual stimulus,
was presented (the participants were, in fact, blindfolded).
Hence, it could perhaps be argued that the unity assumption
is constructed online when multisensory stimuli are presented
and simply did not carry-over to the following unisensory test
session.
When using speech stimuli in the condition where the visual
stimulus was presented together with the to-be-localized sound,
inconsistent results were nevertheless still observed. For example,
Colin et al. (2001) reported that the magnitude of the spatial
ventriloquism effect was unaffected by the congruency between
visual and auditory speech syllables. On the other hand, a very
different pattern of results was reported by Kanaya and Yokosawa
(2011): they conducted a study of the spatial ventriloquism
effect in which a fully visible face was presented on one side
of fixation and a face with a mask on the mouth on the other
(see Figure 4A). Each face uttered one syllable, either /ka/ or
/pa/. At the same time, /ka/ or /pa/ was presented auditorily
from a loudspeaker situated on the bottom left or right of the
screen on which the faces were presented. The participants had
to judge the side (left vs. right) from which the speech sound
appeared to have originated. The results demonstrated that visual
capture primarily occurred in response to the fully visible face
(i.e., a lower sound localization accuracy was observed on the
masked side than on the visible side, see Figure 4B). However,
over-and-above this basic effect of visual saliency, a significantly
larger ventriloquism effect was also documented when the visible
face and the voice uttered the same syllable (the difference
between the two white bars was 57.2%) than when they uttered
6If the temporal correlation between the visual and auditory stimuli was sufficient
to elicit a strong unity effect, the implication would be that the unity effect on
spatial ventriloquism reported by Jackson (1953) should be attributed to the rich
temporal structure rather than necessarily to the semantic congruency between the
pairing of the sound of a steam whistle and the sight of a steaming kettle.
different syllables (the difference between the two black bars was
24.5%).
Even though the spatial ventriloquism effect has been used to
demonstrate the unity effect ever since Jackson’s (1953) seminal
paper, there is a question mark here as to whether spatial
ventriloquism is, in fact, a valid experimental paradigm. The
question that crops up here emerges from a closer inspection of
Welch and Warren’s (1980) early model. Specifically, according to
their conceptualization (see Figure 1), the spatial and temporal
structure of the incoming sensory stimuli are analyzed prior
to the formation of the unity assumption. As such, one might
wonder why the unity effect should be indexed by the modulation
of the size of the window of the spatial ventriloquism effect.
Alternatively, however, one might imagine that such a unity effect
was simply a result of response bias induced by the presence of the
congruent visual signal instead (see Choe et al., 1975; Bertelson
and Radeau, 1981).
Wallace et al. (2004) verified that the spatial ventriloquism
effect is correlated with judgments of unification. These
researchers manipulated both the spatial and temporal disparity
between the visual and auditory stimuli (in this case, an LED
and a burst of white noise) that were presented to participants.
The latter had to try and localize the sound as well as to make
a judgment concerning whether the visual and auditory stimuli
appeared to have been presented from the same location or not
(i.e., they had to make a judgment concerning the unification
of the stimuli). As might have been expected, the proportion
of unification judgments decreased as the spatial and temporal
disparity between the visual and auditory stimuli increased
(see Figure 5A). Interestingly, the proportion of unification
judgments was also positively correlated with the magnitude of
the spatial ventriloquism effect in the sound localization task (see
Figure 2 in Wallace et al., 2004). However, when the visual and
auditory stimuli were not judged as unified, either no bias or else
a small repulsion effect was observed instead. That is, the sound
was more likely to be localized toward the side opposite to the
FIGURE 4 | The experimental setting and results of Kanaya and Yokosawa’s (2011) study looking at the McGurk effect in a spatial ventriloquism
paradigm. (A) The experimental setting of the study. Two human faces were presented side-by-side, one was intact and the other was masked. Two speakers were
put below and aligned with the location of the faces. (B) The results for the auditory stimulus pa. In the incongruent condition (i.e., hearing pa but seeing ka) led to
the perception of ta (i.e., the McGurk effect). In this case, spatial ventriloquism may still occur; that is, the sound localization performance was less accurate when it
was presented at the masked side than the visible side. (C) The results of auditory stimulus ka. In the incongruent condition (with visual stimulus pa), no McGurk
effect would occur; in this case, spatial ventriloquism did not occur either. That is, sound localization performance was similar when it was presented at the masked
or visible side. (B,C) reproduced from Kanaya and Yokosawa (2011) with data provided by the authors.
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light (that is, a counter-ventriloquism effect was obtained; see also
Körding et al., 2007; Rohe and Noppeney, 2015b).
It is important to note, when thinking about these results,
that it is hard to distinguish between two possible causal
relations that might potentially have given rise to the observed
correlation: according to one hypothesis (see Figure 5B), the
spatial ventriloquism effect simply resulted from audiovisual
integration (i.e., the visual and auditory stimuli were unified). It
is, though, hard to explain the counter-ventriloquism effect that
was observed with this account; namely, one might have expected
that sound localization performance was accurate in the absence
of audiovisual integration (i.e., in the absence of unification).
The existence of the counter-ventriloquism effect might suggest
that the sound localization judgment can simply be considered as
reflecting a response strategy that follows on from the unification
judgment instead.
According to a second hypothesis (see Figure 5C), the
unification judgment is based on the perceived location of the
visual and auditory stimuli as being either the same or different.
That is, the unification response can be made even when visual
and auditory stimuli were represented as two distinct unisensory
events that just happened to be presented from the same location.
According to this view, counter-ventriloquism can be explained
as an error of unisensory auditory localization.
Support for the first hypothesis comes from the results
of a study by Wozny and Shams (2011). These researchers
utilized audiovisual spatial recalibration on a trial-by-trial
basis to probe the influence of audiovisual integration. The
hypothesis here is that if the visual and auditory stimuli in
the preceding trial happened to have been integrated and
represented as a single event, then their spatial disparity would
be recalibrated and thus minimized. Presumably, if such a
recalibration effect is carried-over to the following unisensory
auditory trial, the perceived location of the sound in that trial
would be realigned toward the location of the visual stimulus
in the preceding trial. The results indeed demonstrated a causal
relation between audiovisual integration and auditory spatial
realignment. In particular, the spatial realignment of auditory
localization in a given trial was more pronounced when the
visual and auditory stimuli in the preceding trial were perceived
as unified (defined operationally as their perceived spatial
disparity being smaller than 0.5◦) than when they were not
(defined as when their perceived spatial disparity was larger
than 6◦).
Additional evidence in support of the suggestion that the unity
assumption leads to a more pronounced spatial ventriloquism
effect comes from the aforementioned study by Kanaya and
Yokosawa (2011). Specifically, one of the incongruent stimulus
combinations (auditory /pa/, visual /ka/) likely gave rise to the
McGurk effect (perceived /ta/, see the section “The McGurk
Effect”), whereas the other pairing (auditory /ka/, visual /pa/)
did not. Hence, incongruent syllables were presented visually
and auditorily in both conditions, while the perception in
the former condition was likely to have been unified (i.e.,
the pairing giving rise to the McGurk effect) but not in the
latter. A larger spatial ventriloquism effect was observed for
McGurk stimulus pairs that could be unified (in Figure 4B,
the differences between the two black bars was 24.5%) than
the other that could not (in Figure 4C, the differences between
the two black bars was −0.8%). These results therefore suggest
that the unity assumption gives rise to enhanced audiovisual
integration (i.e., a more pronounced spatial ventriloquism
effect)7.
The Temporal Ventriloquism Effect
The unity effect has been demonstrated not only in the spatial,
but also in the temporal domain (see Table 2). So, for example,
the participants in a series of four audiovisual TOJ experiments
conducted by Vatakis and Spence (2007) were presented with
pairs of auditory and visual speech stimuli (either single syllables
7On the other hand, though, one might wonder whether certain speech sounds
might not give rise to a larger ventriloquism effect than others due simply to the
higher temporal correlations (Parise et al., 2012). This factor, nevertheless, was not
controlled with the stimuli used by Kanaya and Yokosawa (2011).
FIGURE 5 | Results of Wallace et al.’s (2004) study of the unity effect and the spatial ventriloquism effect. (A) In the unification judgment task (i.e., judging
whether the visual and auditory stimuli were presented from the same or different locations), the proportion of unification judgments decreased when either spatial or
temporal disparity increased. (B) Hypothesis 1 suggests that the judgment of auditory localization occurs after whether visual and auditory signals were integrated
(i.e., unified) in the spatial domain. That is, the spatial ventriloquism effect results from a unified percept. The auditory localization should be quite accurate if the visual
and auditory signals were not integrated. (C) Hypothesis 2 suggests that the unification judgment is determined by the perceived location of each visual and auditory
signal. That is, the visual and auditory inputs would be judged as unified if they happened to be perceived at the same location. (A) Reproduced from the data
provided in Wallace et al. (2004).
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or words) at various SOAs. The participants in this study had
to make unspeeded TOJs regarding whether the auditory or
visual speech stream had been presented first on each trial.
On half of the trials, the auditory and visual speech stimuli
were gender matched (i.e., a female face was presented together
with a female voice), while on the remainder of the trials, the
auditory and visual speech stimuli were gender mismatched (i.e.,
a female face was presented together with a man’s voice; see
Figure 6A). The participants in all four of Vatakis and Spence’s
experiments found it significantly harder to judge which modality
had been presented first when evaluating the matched stimuli
(JND= 89 ms) than the mismatched stimuli (JND= 68 ms; these
values reflect the average JNDs across Vatakis and Spence, 2007,
Experiments 1–3; see Figure 6B).
Vatakis and Spence (2007) suggested that the presentation of
the matched speech stimuli may have resulted in more temporal
ventriloquism (e.g., Morein-Zamir et al., 2003) than was the case
for the mismatched stimuli (see also Parise and Spence, 2008;
though see Keetels and Vroomen, 2011). That is, the visual event
was temporally aligned to the slightly asynchronous auditory
event, and the unity assumption result in this temporal alignment
occurring over even wider range of intervals in the gender-
matched (as compared to the gender-mismatched) condition.
These results therefore provide empirical support for the claim
that the unity assumption can enhance the integration of visual
and auditory speech stimuli in the temporal domain.
However, subsequent research has complicated the story
somewhat. In particular, while Vatakis et al. (2008) replicated
the unity effect for audiovisual speech stimuli, they repeatedly
(across seven separate experiments) failed to demonstrate any
unity effect when their participants were presented with matched
vs. mismatched videos of musical stimuli (the two stimuli in
this case being a person playing a note on a piano vs. on a
guitar), object actions (someone smashing a block of ice or
TABLE 2 | Summary of the unity effect demonstrated in studies of the temporal ventriloquism effect.
Study Origins of the unity
assumption
Stimuli Experimental
paradigm
Effect?
Vatakis and
Spence, 2007
Semantic congruency Human speech TOJ Yes
Vatakis et al.,
2008
Semantic congruency Human speech, monkey calls TOJ Yes, but only for human speech
Parise and
Spence, 2008
Crossmodal correspondence (size
and pitch)
Visual disk and pure tone Temporal
ventriloquism
Yes
Parise and
Spence, 2009
Crossmodal correspondence (size
and pitch; shape and pitch)
Visual disk and pure tone, Visual
pattern and pure tone
TOJ Yes
Vatakis and
Spence, 2008
Semantic congruency Playing instruments and object actions
(hammer smash ices and ball bouncing)
TOJ No
Keetels and
Vroomen, 2011
Crossmodal correspondence (size
and pitch)
Visual disk and pure tone Temporal
ventriloquism
Replicated the condition in Parise and Spence
(2008), but the result cannot explained by the
temporal ventriloquism effect
TOJ, temporal order judgments.
FIGURE 6 | An example of stimuli and results of Vatakis and colleagues’ experiments of the unity effect on temporal perception (Vatakis and Spence,
2007, 2008; Vatakis et al., 2008). (A) An example of the video and audio used in the studies – they were either matched or not in terms of gender. (B) The results
demonstrated that it was harder for participants to correctly judge the presentation order of the video and audio (i.e., the JND, was significantly higher) when the
stimuli were matched than mismatched. (A) Reprinted from Vatakis and Spence (2008) with permission from the authors.
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dropping a ball on the ground), or monkey calls (monkeys
recorded making either a cooing or a grunting noise) instead
(Vatakis and Spence, 2008; Vatakis et al., 2008). Such results
led Vatakis and Spence to conclude, in line with previous
researchers, that human speech stimuli might, in some sense, be
special.
Before accepting the undoubtedly controversial claim that
speech really is ‘special’ (see also Saldaña and Rosenblum, 1993;
Tuomainen et al., 2005; though see Rosenblum, 2008; Vroomen
and Stekelenburg, 2011), a number of alternative explanations for
these null results need to be ruled out first. One might worry,
for instance, that the participants simply did not notice the
discrepancy between what they heard and saw in the mismatched
condition and hence all of the audiovisual stimulus displays
might just have induced a similar assumption of unity. However,
a number of control experiments conducted by Vatakis and
Spence (2008) revealed that their participants were near-perfect
when it came to discriminating between the congruent and
incongruent audiovisual stimuli. A second possible alternative
explanation might simply involve the suggestion that we have all
had much more exposure to audiovisual speech stimuli than to
musical stimuli or animal vocalizations, and hence the unity effect
might just need very large amounts of prior experience in order to
be demonstrated. Indeed, sometimes experts are more sensitive
to audiovisual asynchrony than novices (e.g., Petrini et al.,
2009; Lee and Noppeney, 2014). However, control experiments
with trained musicians and those working extensively with
monkeys once again failed to demonstrate a unity effect with
stimuli in their area of expertise/familiarity that the participants
could easily segregate into matched vs. mismatched stimulus
pairs.
Interim Summary Concerning the Spatial
and Temporal Ventriloquism Effect
The literature reviewed in the above two sections has
demonstrated that the unity assumption enhances multisensory
integration in terms of a more pronounced spatial or temporal
ventriloquism effect under certain conditions. Nevertheless,
in reviewing these studies, a number of pitfalls associated
with early attempts to provide evidence in support of the
unity assumption have also been highlighted. For example,
while the spatial ventriloquism effect is modulated by
the unity assumption (e.g., Kanaya and Yokosawa, 2011;
Wozny and Shams, 2011), such unequivocal evidence for
the temporal ventriloquism effect using the TOJ task is
currently lacking. In addition, while the unity effect has
been demonstrated reliably using human speech stimuli, it
does not necessarily extend to the case of other classes of
stimuli, such as audiovisual music clips (see Vatakis and
Spence, 2007, 2008; Vatakis et al., 2008; though see Jackson,
1953).
The McGurk Effect
According to the argument that speech is special, one should also
expect to find a unity effect for other examples of audiovisual
speech integration, such as the McGurk effect (McGurk and
MacDonald, 1976). Previous research has manipulated various
factors that may lead to different levels of the unity assumption,
such as spatial and temporal disparities, stimulus congruency,
and context (see Table 3).
Temporal synchrony and spatial coincidence, the two basic
rules of multisensory integration, have been tested in the McGurk
effect. The McGurk effect is reliably observed in a temporal
window which is asymmetrical. Specifically, this window is wider
in the condition where the visual leading auditory stimulus than
vice versa (Massaro and Cohen, 1993; Munhall et al., 1996; Jones
and Jarick, 2006; van Wassenhove et al., 2007; Soto-Faraco and
Alsius, 2009)8. By contrast, the McGurk effect seems not to
be influenced by the spatial disparity between the visual and
auditory stimulus (Jones and Munhall, 1997; Jones and Jarick,
2006; see Spence, 2013, for a review).
In one of the above studies, Munhall et al. (1996) also
presented the visual and auditory consonant that could lead to
the McGurk effect being sandwiched between either matched or
mismatched vowels. Specifically, their participants heard /aba/
while viewing the lip movements associated with /aga/ (matched
vowels) or /igi/ (mismatched vowels). The results revealed that
the McGurk effect (i.e., perceiving the consonant as /d/) was
larger when the auditory and visual vowels were matched.
Meanwhile, Easton and Basala (1982) conducted two
experiments in which they assessed the ability of participants to
lip-read (monosyllabic or compound words) under conditions
of unisensory visual presentation vs. discrepant audiovisual
presentation. In the latter condition, they varied the degree of
discordance of the initial and/or final phonemes of the words that
were presented. The participants’ recognition of visual speech
(that is, their lip-reading performance) was substantially biased
by the presence of discrepant auditory information (indexed by
the error of participants misreporting the ‘lipped’ word as the
dubbed word). Interestingly, this auditory bias decreased when
both the initial and final phonemes (as compared to when only
one of them) were discrepant. In addition, Easton and Basala
also manipulated the gender of the speaker and the dubbed voice
to either match or not. The result demonstrated that the auditory
bias was smaller when the gender was mismatched (though see
Green et al., 1991).
The matching between human faces and voices can
nevertheless influence the McGurk effect in a more specific
way as a function of familiarity. Walker et al.’s (1995) study
demonstrated that the unity assumption may vary from one
individual to the next. In particular, when participants reported
being familiar with either the speaker’s face or voice, a reduced
McGurk effect was observed when the speaker’s face or voice
was replaced by another person’s, irrespective of whether they
had the same or different gender. This result suggests that unity
assumption can be formed for a particular pair of face and voice
belonging to a person due to familiarity.
8This feature is consistent with the fact that the window in which audiovisual
simultaneity is perceived is typically wider when vision leads than when audition
leads (Zampini et al., 2005). However, the width of the temporal windows of the
McGurk effect and audiovisual simultaneity seem to be different (van Wassenhove
et al., 2007; Soto-Faraco and Alsius, 2009).
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TABLE 3 | Summary of the unity effect demonstrated in studies of the McGurk effect.
Study Origins of the unity
assumption
Stimuli Perception Effect?
Massaro and
Cohen, 1993
Temporal synchrony (±200 ms) V: /da/; A: /ba/ /va/ or /ga/ Yes: /va/ decreased and /ga/ increased when V
leading
Munhall et al.,
1996
Temporal synchrony (±360 ms)
Stimulus congruency (vowel)
V: /aga/ or /igi/; A:
/aba/
/ada/ or /idi/ Yes: −60 to 240 ms for V/aga/
No effect for V/igi/
van Wassenhove
et al., 2007
Temporal synchrony (±467 ms) V: /ka/ or /ga/; A: /pa/
or /ba/
/ta/ or /da/ Yes: −30 to 170 ms
Soto-Faraco and
Alsius, 2009
Temporal synchrony (−640 to
720 ms)
V: /ba/; A:/da/ /bda/ Yes: −320 to 480 ms
Jones and
Munhall, 1997
Spatial disparity (±90◦) V: /igi/, /IgI/ or /ægæ/
A: /igi/, /IgI/ or /ægæ/
/idi/, /IdI/ or /ædæ/ No
Jones and Jarick,
2006
Temporal synchrony (±360 ms)
Spatial disparity (±90◦)
V: /ava/; A: /aba/ /ava/ or /aba/ Yes: −60 to 180 ms
No effect for spatial disparity
Easton and
Basala, 1982
Congruency (phonetic) V: lips movements; A:
spoken words
Errors in lip-reading Yes: fewer errors in lip-reading in the higher
discrepancy condition
Green et al., 1991 Congruency (gender) V /ga/ or /gi/; A:/ba/ or
/bi/
/da/, /ða/ or /di/,
/ði/
No
Walker et al.,
1995
Familiarity (face and voice from
familiar or unfamiliar person)
V /ga/ or /gi/; A:/ba/ or
/bi/
/da/, /ða/ or /di/,
/ði/
Yes: the McGurk effect was larger for familiar face
and voice
Nahorna et al.,
2012
Context (coherence of
audiovisual syllables)
V: /ga/; A:/ba/ /da/ Yes: larger McGurk effect in the coherent context
Nahorna et al.,
2015
Context (coherence of
audiovisual syllables)
V: /ga/; A:/ba/ /da/ Yes: smaller McGurk effect when perceiving one
incoherent syllable, but recovered after perceiving
more coherent syllables
V: vision; A: audition.
The negative values indicate the auditory leading intervals, whereas the positive values indicate the visual leading intervals; the negative angles indicate that the auditory
stimulus was presented on the left, whereas the positive angles indicate that the auditory stimulus was presented on the right.
Finally, the McGurk effect is influenced by context
(concerning stimulus congruency) that leads to the tendency
of either binding the incoming audiovisual signals or not. For
example, people demonstrated a larger McGurk effect if they had
heard a series of audiovisual speech stimuli that were congruent
rather than incongruent (Nahorna et al., 2012). Later studies
demonstrated that such a contextual effect is highly malleable.
Specifically, the tendency to separate visual and auditory stimuli
can be rapidly established by just perceiving one incongruent
audiovisual syllable, while it can also be reversed by experiencing
more congruent audiovisual syllables (Nahorna et al., 2015).
Such a contextual effect on segregating visual and auditory
stimuli in the incongruent context is associated with increased
activities at the left inferior frontal sulcus (Gau and Noppeney,
2016).
In summary, the temporal, rather than spatial, proximity
between the visual and auditory stimuli has been shown to
modulate the McGurk effect (e.g., Jones and Jarick, 2006). In
addition, the congruency of stimulus identity modulates the
extent to which people integrate multisensory speech stimuli
(Easton and Basala, 1982; Munhall et al., 1996; though see Green
et al., 1991). Furthermore, familiarity with the speakers in the
video-clips is also a strong modulatory factor at the level of the
individual participant (see Walker et al., 1995). Finally, prior
experience regarding whether the visual and auditory speech
signals are congruent or not provides a context that modulates
the magnitude of the McGurk effect.
The Colavita Visual Dominance Effect
The Colavita effect is the name that has been given to an example
of visual dominance over audition (see Colavita, 1974). In a
typical study, participants are presented with an unpredictable
sequence of visual, auditory, and audiovisual targets requiring
a speeded detection response. Oftentimes, the participants are
instructed to press one response key whenever the visual target
is presented and another key whenever the auditory target is
presented; on the bimodal trials, the participants are instructed
to press both response keys (or else to press a third key). No
matter how the participants respond, a common result that
has been obtained over the years is that the participants fail
to respond to some proportion of the auditory targets on the
bimodal trials (i.e., they only respond to the visual target),
while making very few errors on the unimodal auditory trials
(see Spence et al., 2011, for a review). In fact, it is as if the
simultaneous presentation of the visual stimulus extinguishes the
participant’s awareness of, or at least their ability to respond to,
the auditory stimulus on a certain proportion of the bimodal
trials.
A partial answer concerning whether the unity assumption
modulates the Colavita visual dominance effect has come
from a series of experiments reported by Spence and his
colleagues (see Table 4). For example, both temporal synchrony
and spatial coincidence factors modulate the Colavita effect
(defined as the increased likelihood of missing the auditory
target than missing the visual target on the bimodal trials).
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TABLE 4 | Summary of the unity effect demonstrated in studies of the Colavita visual dominance effect.
Study Origins of the unity
assumption
Stimuli Experimental paradigm Effect?
Koppen and Spence, 2007a Temporal synchrony (±600 ms) V: LED; A: pure tone
(4000 Hz)
Speeded detection Yes: −35 to 150 ms
Koppen and Spence, 2007b Spatial disparity (±13◦ or ±26◦) V: LED; A: white noise Speeded detection Yes: larger Colavita effect in
the same location condition
Hartcher-O’Brien et al., 2008 Spatial disparity (±12.5◦) V: LED; T: tactile vibrations Speeded detection Yes: larger Colavita effect in
the same location condition
Koppen et al., 2008 Semantic congruency V: dog or cat picture; A:
barking or meowing sound
Speeded detection No
Stekelenburg and Keetels, 2015 Crossmodal correspondence
(size and pitch)
Visual disk and pure tone Speeded detection No
V: vision; A: audition; T: touch.
The negative values indicate the auditory leading intervals, whereas the positive values indicate the visual leading intervals; the negative angles indicate that the auditory
stimulus was presented on the left, whereas the positive angles indicate that the auditory stimulus was presented on the right.
Koppen and Spence (2007a) manipulated the SOA between
the visual and auditory targets on the bimodal trials. The
results demonstrated the Colavita effect was observed over the
window from when auditory led by 35 ms through until visual
leading by 150 ms. Similarly, the Colavita effect occurred more
often when the visual and auditory targets were presented
at the same location than from different locations (13◦ or
26◦ disparity) on the bimodal trials (Koppen and Spence,
2007b; see Hartcher-O’Brien et al., 2008, for the Colavita effect
showing vision’s dominance over touch too). In summary, on
the bimodal trials, the visual and auditory targets that are
presented close in time and space led to a larger Colavita
effect.
A third factor eliciting the unity assumption that has been
tested in the Colavita effect literature is semantic congruency.
The auditory stimuli in this study consisted of the sound of a
cat meowing or a dog woofing, and the visual stimuli consisted
of the pictures of a cat and of a dog (Koppen et al., 2008).
On the bimodal trials, the auditory and visual stimuli could
either be semantically congruent (i.e., the sight and sound of a
dog) or else semantically incongruent (i.e., the sound of a cat
presented together with the sight of a dog). The magnitude of the
Colavita visual dominance effect was completely unaffected by
the semantic congruency between the auditory and visual stimuli.
This result was also replicated when using audiovisual speech
stimuli in their Experiment 3.
Importantly, however, Koppen et al. (2008) found that the
semantic congruency between the visual and auditory stimuli
influenced certain other aspects of participants’ performance
when the bimodal trials were associated with a third response
key. Specifically, reaction times on the bimodally congruent
trials were significantly faster than on the bimodally incongruent
trials, a result that can perhaps best be explained in terms of
the effect of semantic congruency on the redundant targets
effect (see Miller, 1991; Laurienti et al., 2004). Hence, semantic
congruency only influenced the participant’s response when both
visual and auditory stimuli were processed (i.e., the participants
correctly pressed the key corresponding to perceiving both visual
and auditory stimuli). This result therefore suggests that the
Colavita visual dominance effect may occur at an earlier stage
of information processing than the stage at which crossmodal
semantic congruency is computed (see Spence et al., 2011, for a
review).
Stekelenburg and Keetels (2015) tested whether the
crossmodal correspondence between visual size and auditory
pitch (i.e., larger size matched to lower-pitched sounds) would
modulate the Colavita visual dominance effect. Once again,
a similar Colavita effect was observed in the matched and
mismatched conditions. Furthermore, they did not observe any
modulation of reaction times as a function of the crossmodal
correspondence between the stimuli. One explanation for this
is that the detection of stimulus congruency (around 400 ms
after stimulus onset in terms of their event-related potentials
results) was later than the decision and/or planning of motor
responses (note that the participants’ mean reaction time was
640 ms on the bimodal trials). An alternative possibility here
is that it may be hard to elicit any crossmodal correspondence
effects implicitly, unless the participants are told (or aware of)
the relationship between the component stimuli (e.g., Klapetek
et al., 2012).
The results reviewed in this section demonstrate that the
Colavita visual dominance effect follows the spatial and temporal
rules of multisensory integration. However, the unity assumption,
either induced by semantic congruency or by crossmodal
correspondences, cannot modulate the magnitude of the Colavita
effect (Koppen et al., 2008; Stekelenburg and Keetels, 2015).
Participants’ performance in terms of the reaction time measure
was, nevertheless, susceptible to semantic congruency when
visual and auditory stimuli were both detected (Koppen et al.,
2008). Combining these results suggests that temporal synchrony
and spatial coincidence factors may modulate the Colavita
effect in a bottom–up manner (see the model shown in
Figure 1). The weak influence of the unity assumption in
the Colavita effect suggests that the visual dominance likely
occurs at an early stage of information processing, and so the
unity assumption (either based on crossmodal correspondences,
or semantic congruency) cannot penetrate down to this
stage.
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FROM THE ‘UNITY ASSUMPTION’ TO
BAYESIAN ‘PRIORS’
Thus far, we have reviewed the empirical evidence concerning the
unity effect by comparing those multisensory stimulus pairs of
which the observer has a reason to believe ought to go together
to the other pairs that were either mismatched or unrelated.
At around the same time as Vatakis and Spence (2007, 2008;
Vatakis et al., 2008) were revisiting the unity effect in human
behavior, other researchers were examining this issue using the
computational modeling approach based on Bayes’ rule (e.g.,
Ernst, 2007; Körding et al., 2007; see Shams and Beierholm,
2010, 2011, for reviews). According to such models, the unity
assumption can be computed as a prior term.
The Prior in the Bayesian Causal
Inference Model
When two sensory inputs come from different modalities, our
perceptual system may have to compute and infer whether they
have a common cause (so that they should be integrated) or else
different causes (in which case they should be kept separate). For
example, in an audiovisual spatial ventriloquism experiment, if
the participants infer that the two stimuli have a common cause,
spatial ventriloquism should occur; otherwise, the stimuli are
assumed to refer to different sources, and therefore no spatial
ventriloquism effect is observed (e.g., Wallace et al., 2004). Such
a causal inference process in the case of spatial ventriloquism
was modeled using a Bayesian probability algorithm by Körding
et al. (2007). In Körding et al.’s model, the variables include the
perceived spatial locations of the visual and auditory stimuli,
as well as a prior term (called pcommon in the paper) denoting
the observer’s knowledge as to how likely the two stimuli are to
have a common cause. In the latest study reported by Odegaard
and Shams (2016), it has been shown that the prior of common
cause indeed positively correlated with the degree of multisensory
integration. Furthermore, this prior is stable over time for a given
participant in a given task. The Bayesian causal inference model
has been used to study human behavioral responses (Wozny et al.,
2010; Rohe and Noppeney, 2015b) and the underlying neural
networks (Rohe and Noppeney, 2015a, 2016) when perfoming a
spatial ventriloquism task.
Note that the prior term and the sensory inputs (or
representations) in the Bayesian causal inference model are
dissociated. So, for example, when the sensory representations
change, such as the reliability of the stimulus being reduced
by decreasing the luminance contrast of the visual stimulus,
the prior remains constant (Beierholm et al., 2009). To date,
however, only a few studies have empirically examined the precise
value of the prior of common cause in the Bayesian causal
inference model (e.g., Beierholm et al., 2009; Odegaard and
Shams, 2016), while the question of how the prior systematically
changes with the manipulated unity assumption is still unclear.
For example, in Jackson’s (1953) classic demonstration of the
unity effect in the spatial ventriloquism effect, the prior of
common cause for the stimulus pairing of a steaming kettle and a
whistling sound should be higher than that for the pair of light
and bell; on the other hand, the spatial representations of the
visual and auditory stimuli in the two conditions might be the
same.
One might wonder what exactly the “prior” means here. In
an early paper, Shams et al. (2005) modeled an audiovisual
integration phenomenon called the sound-induced flash illusion
(Shams et al., 2000) and proposed that the prior denotes
“. . .the perceptual knowledge of the observer about the auditory-
visual events in the environment. In addition to the observer’s
experience, the priors may also reflect hardwired biases imposed
by the physiology and anatomy of the brain (e.g., the pattern
of interconnectivity between the sensory areas), as well as biases
imposed by the task, the observer’s state, etc.” (Shams et al.,
2005, p. 1924). Therefore, it would seem hard to characterize
an observer’s priors as being attributable to the hard-wired
neural connections which should be stable over time (Odegaard
and Shams, 2016), or induced by a given set of environmental
stimuli or conditions, while only the latter is relevant to the
observer’s assumption or belief of unity. Another piece of
evidence comes from the more pronounced effect of audiovisual
integration in the peripheral as compared to central visual field
(e.g., Charbonneau et al., 2013; Gleiss and Kayser, 2013; Chen
et al., submitted), which is thought to be partly attributable to
the more extensive neural connectivity across sensory-dominant
areas in the periphery (Falchier et al., 2002; Rockland and Ojima,
2003).
In summary, researchers using the Bayesian causal inference
model have successfully demonstrated that human performance
in the spatial ventriloquism task is statistically optimal.
Specifically, when determining whether visual and auditory
signals would be integrated or separated, human brains compute
sensory information as well as include a prior that represents a
probability or tendency to integrate. In order to further link the
Bayesian causal inference model to psychological mechanisms,
one future goal would obviously be to examine whether the
prior of common cause can be used to quantify the different
levels of the unity assumption and to predict human behavior.
In this case, a particular prior term may be able to match to a
particular source of unity assumption as discussed in the section
“Factors Leading to the Unity Assumption” (see Jones and Love,
2011).
How are Priors Established?
It is clear that we can acquire new crossmodal associations
between pairs of stimuli that have not been experienced as
systematically related before. To put things simply, just imagine
the situation of someone who has never seen a light saber before
(as made famous by the Star Wars movies). On first seeing such a
weapon, the person will presumably have no idea about what that
weapon would sound like, or even that it should make a sound.
Now, by repeatedly seeing and hearing the light saber in action,
the person will presumably have sufficient evidence to establish
knowledge of the light saber by the end of the movie. The key
question here becomes how much exposure is required in order
to establish or change the strength of the assumption of unity
(or prior) – one may imagine that a relatively small number of
exposures might be sufficient.
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The available evidence from behavioral studies suggests that
the crossmodal facilitation between arbitrary pairings of visual
and auditory stimuli (such as letters and pure tones) is only
observed when the sound and the visual target reliably co-occur
during the course of the experiment (Lippert et al., 2007; Chen
and Spence, 2011a). Neuroimaging evidence shows increased
cross-cortical activation following even a very small number of
co-occurrences (Fiebelkorn et al., 2010, 2012; Zangenehpour and
Zatorre, 2010; Liu et al., 2012). The evidence from the world of
olfactory-gustatory correspondences research suggests that such
associations can be acquired after only a handful of trials when
people are exposed to a novel odorant (see Stevenson and Boakes,
2004, for a review).
In daily life, the time required to learn new associations
between multisensory stimuli (or to establish a new prior) is
hard to estimate. At birth, human new-borns already have
rudimentary abilities to detect temporal synchrony or spatial
coincidence between visual and auditory signals (Morrongiello
et al., 1998; Lewkowicz et al., 2010). These provide the basis
for learning the associations between newly seen and heard
stimuli. By 12 months of age, infants are able to learn about
two new visual objects, that each produces a characteristic
sound. This occurs after a training period of less than 10 min
if tested immediately (Baumgartner and Oakes, 2011). This is
the age by which the infants have perhaps developed sufficient
cognitive capacities and knowledge to underpin such rapid
audiovisual association learning. It should be noted that while
such associative learning is rapidly acquired, it is perhaps
forgotten quickly too if follow-up experience is lacking. The
formation of a unity assumption (and so, a new prior) that
can influence human perception rapidly or over a longer
time scale needs to take the human developmental trajectory
and brain plasticity into consideration (see Murray et al.,
2016).
In one of the most convincing studies using the prior term
in a Bayesian model to represent the learning of the mapping
between crossmodal signals, Ernst (2007) trained the participants
with typically unrelated visual and tactile features; specifically,
luminance and stiffness. After a training session of about 1.5–
2.5 h of exposure, the luminance and stiffness dimensions became
correlated, leading to better performance in the congruent (i.e.,
the trained pairing) than in the incongruent condition. He
called this newly learned mapping between the visual and tactile
features a ‘coupling prior,’ which leads to a higher likelihood of
integrating the multisensory signals.
According to the Bayesian causal inference model, the prior
of common cause (pcommon) refers to “how likely two co-occurring
signals are to have a common cause vs. two independent causes”
(Körding et al., 2007, p. 3). This is close to the notion of the
unity assumption. On the other hand, the coupling prior that
was established in Ernst’s (2007) study refers to the participants’
knowledge of “mapping uncertainly between the two signals,”
which is closer to the idea of crossmodal correspondence. Such
differences raise a problem for the coupling prior: when exactly
one should consider that there is sufficient evidence for the unity
assumption to emerge? What is more, it would appear that the
notion of coupling priors makes no assumption as to whether
two stimuli belong to the same object or not; instead, all that is
entailed is that the stimuli are correlated.
Interim Summary
The research that has been reviewed in this section highlights
the computational approach in modeling the unity assumption
according to the Bayesian causal inference model using
a prior term (pcommon). Ernst (2007) has demonstrated
that even a couple of hours of exposure to co-occurring
visual and tactile stimuli can lead to a stronger coupling
prior between them. Nevertheless, the coupling prior seems
no more than a correlation or association between the
stimuli, and the concern that whether crossmodal signals
that are associated (or congruent) would be integrated as
a unified object/event remains (see the section “Crossmodal
Correspondences”).
THE UNITY EFFECT: OUTSTANDING
ISSUES
Having reviewed the core literature relevant to assessing the
impact of the unity assumption on multisensory integration, all
that remains is to discuss a number of outstanding issues in the
area that have yet to be resolved.
The Unity Effect – All a Matter of
Definition?
According to Welch and Warren’s (1980) original definition, the
‘unity assumption’ was used as a term to refer to those situations
in which an observer believed that the various unisensory
stimuli with which they had been presented belonged to one
and the same object or event. Hence, research on crossmodal
correspondences would not necessarily be relevant. This is
because while people do indeed believe that different sensory cues
can be mapped between two continuous unisensory dimensions
or categories, they do not necessarily think that the stimuli belong
to one and the same object or event. To make the distinction
absolutely clear, while most people would choose ‘bouba’ as the
appropriate matching for a rounded cloud-like shape and ‘kiki,’
for an angular star-like shape (see Ramachandran and Hubbard,
2001; Bremner et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2016), they do not
necessarily believe that those are the names of those shapes.
Similarly, most of the research that has been published to date
on the topic of semantic congruency effects is also irrelevant to
the debate concerning the unity effect given a strict definition
of the phenomenon (e.g., Connolly, 2014). Most researchers
studying semantic congruency have chosen to present pairs of
stimuli that, while they refer to the same concept (e.g., dog), do
not necessarily refer to the same specific multisensory object or
event. That is, no one is likely to think that the line drawing of a
dog is the source of the barking sound that they hear in a typical
semantic congruency experiment.9
9Note that one other problem that raises its head at this point is that the very
definition of a multisensory object is itself problematic (Spence et al., 2014), with
some researchers (e.g., Busse et al., 2005; Turatto et al., 2005) seemingly being more
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However, here we would like to argue that this uncertainty
doesn’t matter too much when it comes to evaluating the effects of
the unity assumption. Considering that the fundamental question
is how the unity assumption helps solve the crossmodal binding
problem, it is essential to understand the condition in which each
factor would work. Therefore, rather than restricting ourselves
to a narrow definition, we favor the alternative position. That
is, to broaden the definition of the unity assumption to include
any factor that may lead to people’s believing that two or more
stimuli ‘belong together.’ Then, in future studies, it would be
critical to clearly specify the source that leads to the formation
of unity assumption in the observer’s mind, and try to quantify
the influence of each source.
Is Speech Special in Terms of the Unity
Effect?
As has been mentioned already, some have wanted to suggest
that speech is perhaps special. This is because the unity effect can
be reliably observed for speech stimuli under the condition that
spatial and temporal coincidence can be violated (reviewed in
the sections of The Spatial and Temporal Ventriloquism Effect).
Nevertheless, at least as far as the unity effect goes, more recent
research shows that the unity assumption induced by emotional
valence is perhaps also powerful. For example, in Petrini et al.’s
(2010) study, participants had to rate the emotional valence of
a video showing a drummer or saxophonist playing a musical
instrument. Performance in this emotion rating task was worse
(i.e., slower reaction time and/or less accurate) when the video
was paired with sound produced by the same instrument but with
an incongruent emotional valence, even when the video and the
sound did not correspond temporally.
Integrating visual and auditory emotion signals, as compared
to speech perception, has received far less attention in studies
of multisensory perception (e.g., Massaro and Egan, 1996; de
Gelder and Vroomen, 2000; Vroomen et al., 2001; Föcker et al.,
2011; Maiworm et al., 2012). Nevertheless, both speech and
emotion perception are critical in our daily social interactions,
and they rely heavily on the integration of information conveyed
by face/lips movements in vision and vocal features in audition.
Therefore, speech and emotion are likely underpinned by a
common mechanism for integrating multisensory information
from face and voice (see Massaro and Cohen, 2000; Campanella
and Belin, 2007).
Is the Unity Assumption a Conscious
Belief?
A separate issue here concerns the question of whether
anything depends on the observer’s conscious awareness about
the relationship between the relevant unisensory inputs. For
example, the first author in Arnold et al.’s (2005) study took
part in the experiment and reported adopting a strategy of
than happy to treat otherwise unrelated auditory and visual stimuli as constituting
a multisensory object, just as long as they occur at more or less the same place or
the same time. We certainly do not wish to endorse such a position. However, a full
discussion of this issue, i.e., how to define a multisensory object, if they exist, will
take another article to work though.
imagining that asynchronous pairs of auditory and visual
stimuli originated from the same distal event. His performance
then demonstrated a perceptual compensation for the travel
time difference of light and sound, whereas other naïve
participants did not. Presumably, accepting that merely the
observer’s conscious belief10 regarding certain stimuli belonging
together were able to change the degree of multisensory
integration would take us into the issue of cognitive penetrability
(e.g., Macpherson, 2012), and ‘the new look’ movement (e.g.,
Francis, 2012). It would seem, though, that despite the fact
that researchers have been talking about the influence of
the unity assumption for decades now, a clear consensus
has still not been reached as to whether the observer is
required to be consciously aware of the mapping between the
component sensory stimuli or not. The early work of Welch
and Warren (1980) certainly made it seem like this was the
case. However, nowadays, this condition seems to have fallen
by the wayside (see the section “Factors Leading to the Unity
Assumption”).
In any case, the unity assumption provides a clear example
of the top–down modulation of human multisensory perception.
This mechanism can fit into one of the most intriguing modern
views of human perception, known as predictive coding. This view
suggests that human brain is proactive in predicting the state
of the outside world and so the incoming sensory signals; the
received sensory signals, in turn, provide sensory evidence to
verify the predictions (e.g., Friston, 2005; Bar, 2007; Friston et al.,
2015; Kok and de Lange, 2015). The unity assumption, either
generated by one’s beliefs, prior experience, or the features of the
stimuli, modulates the incoming multisensory signals to be either
integrated (i.e., giving rise to the unity effect) or not, and therefore
can be considered as a sort of prediction. Theories of predictive
coding, nevertheless, do not necessarily consider the top–down
modulations at the conscious level (see Macpherson, 2017). The
predictive coding view would also provide a theoretical basis
to examine unity assumption in modern neuroscience approach
(e.g., Gau and Noppeney, 2016) and Bayesian modeling approach
(e.g., Odegaard and Shams, 2016) in future research.
Does the Unity Effect Require
Experience?
Welch and Warren (1980; see Figure 1) included one box in their
model for experimental instructions. Nevertheless, it has been
shown to be insufficient to induce a unity effect based simply
on instruction from the experimenter (Warren et al., 1981). This
raises the question of how the unity assumption can be formed
and updated by experiencing the co-occurrence of the relevant
unisensory stimuli, in addition to through what is said by the
experimenter to the participants?
In Nahorna et al.’s (2012, 2015) studies, the participants’
tendency to integrate audiovisual speech information can be
induced (or reversed) by the context presented a few hundreds
10Welch and Warren’s (1980) early paper had a section entitled the “Awareness of
the discrepancy” that is relevant here. The evidence reviewed there was taken to
support the claim that the multisensory integration of visual and proprioceptive
cues, as compared to visual and auditory cues, is somewhat less susceptible to the
participants’ awareness of the multisensory discrepancy.
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of ms before the target stimuli. Additionally, Wozny and Shams
(2011) have demonstrated that the experience of unity for
arbitrarily paired visual and auditory stimuli can modulate
subsequent perception on a trial-by-trial basis. Note here that
the speed of forming the unity assumption (or prior of common
cause) may not be comparable for different combinations of
sensory modalities because cross-talk between different senses
are unequal (it could be hypothesized, say, that audiovisual
interplay should be most extensive). Taken together, the unity
assumption for two newly paired crossmodal stimuli can form
rapidly in terms of experience; however, the remaining question
is how strong it is and whether it builds up over successive
exposures.
Does attention Give Rise to a “Unity
Effect”?
Attention has been taken to be a critical cognitive factor
in modulating multisensory integration (see Figure 1; see
Talsma et al., 2010, for a review). Previous research has
demonstrated that the effect of multisensory integration is more
pronounced when the participants attend to stimuli in both
sensory modalities rather than focusing on just the stimulus
in one modality (e.g., Talsma et al., 2007; Mozolic et al., 2008;
Fairhall and Macaluso, 2009). At first glance, such evidence
suggests that attending to multiple sensory modalities should
enhance the multisensory integration (i.e., leading to a unity
effect).
A recent study using Bayesian models to quantify the prior
of common cause (pcommon) suggests that attention does not
seem to increase the tendency of multisensory integration.
Odegaard et al. (2016) examined the influence of attention on
the spatial ventriloquism effect. The result demonstrates that the
reliability of the visual or auditory signal was higher when the
participants attended to that modality than when they divided
their attention between both modalities; however, the prior of
common cause did not significantly change in the focus vs.
divided attention condition. Other studies have manipulated the
participants’ attentional resources using a single vs. dual tasking
manipulation, and the results demonstrated the participants’
performance remained statistically optimal in both conditions
(Helbig and Ernst, 2008; Vercillo and Gori, 2015; Wahn and
König, 2016). Taken together, these results therefore suggest that
the allocation of attention across sensory modalities or tasks does
not influence the tendency toward binding multisensory signals.
That is, attention and the unity assumption seem to be two
different mechanisms in multisensory integration.
Has the ‘Unity Assumption’ Fallen Out of
Fashion?
Given these various concerns, it would seem legitimate at this
point to consider whether we wouldn’t simply be better off
dispensing with the very notion of the unity assumption. What
exactly, one might ask, would be lost were we to scrap the term,
and instead simply replace it with the notion of the prior term
FIGURE 7 | Number of published articles including the word of “unity effect” (or “unity assumption”) and “coupling prior” in the title, abstract, or in
the text of papers listed in Google Scholar in the past 20 years. The use of both terms has been rising slowly but surely in recent years, thus arguing against
those claim that the notion of the unity effect/assumption has fallen out of fashion in recent years.
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from the Bayesian approach (e.g., Ernst, 2007; Körding et al.,
2007; Beierholm et al., 2009; Rohe and Noppeney, 2015a,b)?
Indeed, this review reveals that the unity assumption can
originate from heterogeneous causes. In addition, it remains
unclear whether the unity assumption relates to an observer’s
conscious belief, or just an implicit sense that the multisensory
sensory inputs belong together. Finally, to date, the behavioral
data fail to tell a clear story about (or to predict) precisely which
conditions, or stimuli, will give rise to a unity effect, and which
will not.
Given all of the above, some might say that the research field
has already implicitly eliminated all further discussion of the
‘unity assumption’. Nevertheless, a Google Scholar search on the
term unity effect/unity assumption in the title, abstract, or in the
text of papers reveals an ever increasing number of hits along with
the term ‘coupling prior’ (see Figure 7).
CONCLUSION
Thus, in conclusion, in this review we have demonstrated that
the unity assumption influences multisensory integration across
a range of stimulus pairs from multiple sensory modalities. We
have put forward the view that, in addition to the experimenter’s
instructions, the literature on crossmodal correspondences and
semantic congruency, can all potentially be subsumed with
the debate on the unity assumption. The evidence primarily
comes from several experimental paradigms including the spatial
and temporal ventriloquism effect, and the McGurk effect.
Hence, it is clear that the unity assumption genuinely modulates
human behavioral performance, especially in audiovisual speech
perception. Finally, we have reviewed the evidence from those
studies that have used Bayesian models to simulate human
multisensory integration, in which the prior of common cause,
a variable that represents the probability of two signals going
together, can be linked to the unity assumption discussed
within current cognitive frameworks. As such, we would argue
that the prior of common cause provides a novel means
of quantifying the unity effect in cognitive models in future
research.
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